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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1989, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer' entered into force, binding forty-six signa-
tory nations to limits on the production and consumption of chemicals
believed to be destroying the protective layer of ozone that encircles the
earth. Negotiated in rapid response to mounting evidence of potentially
irreversible damage to the global environment, the treaty is a milestone
in the history of international cooperation. It marks the first effort of
the international community to avert an environmental crisis, instead of
waiting for the crisis to occur before acting.
Unfortunately, the treaty does not end the production or use of
chemicals suspected of destroying ozone. Further, the Protocol cannot
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1. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone, Final Act, September
16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter The Protocol]. As of this
writing, the Protocol has yet to receive an official United Nations citation.
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prevent already released chemicals from harming the earth's atmo-
sphere.2 The accord, therefore, cannot be viewed as a definitive solution
to the problem of ozone depletion. It does, however, represent an im-
portant first step toward successfully attacking the significant political,
economic and scientific barriers that have doomed previous environ-
mental agreements and may even point the way to a new era of inter-
national cooperation in protecting the global environment from other
potential catastrophes.
After a brief discussion of the nature of the ozone problem, this
comment will review the advances in international environmental law
that culminated in the Montreal Protocol. It will then focus on the
treaty's methods for overcoming many of the difficulties that have
plagued previous environmental agreements. Finally, this comment will
review the accord's limitations and suggest ways to use it as a basis for
the development of new mechanisms to protect the global environment.
II. THE OZONE DEPLETION PROBLEM
High above the earth's surface, an invisible layer of ozone serves
as a shield, absorbing the sun's ultraviolet rays and preventing them
from ever reaching the planet. The formation of ozone atoms is a rela-
tively simple process; it requires only the interaction of ordinary oxygen
and ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Through natural chemical reac-
tions dependent upon variations in sun strength and the amount of oxy-
gen in the atmosphere, stratospheric ozone is continually produced and
destroyed.
Scientists formerly presumed that there was a constant level of
ozone in the upper levels of the atmosphere, where oxygen is abundant.
But, as early as 1974, speculation occurred that the "ozone layer," a
relatively thin layer of gas in the stratosphere, was subject to deple-
tion.3 Only eleven years later, researchers reported a hole in the ozone
2. Current ozone measurements reflect only gases released in the 1970s and ear-
lier; gases now in the lower atmosphere (ground level to about five miles from the
earth's surface) will take seven to ten years to reach the stratosphere (which stretches
from the lower atmosphere to approximately thirty miles above the earth's surface). As
the chemicals in refrigerators and insulating foams continue to break down over the
next decade, even more gases will gradually be released. Government scientists esti-
mate that the levels of these gases will not stop rising until they reach six to eight parts
per billion, more than double their present levels. Gleick, Treaty Powerless to Stem a
Growing Loss of Ozone, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1988, at 1, col.2.
3. Molina and Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofloromethanes: Chlorine
Atom Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). (Two years after
Molina and Rowland's article appeared, the National Academy of Science ("NAS")
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layer over Antarctica. A natural filter, ozone screens out much of the
dangerous solar radiation thought to be responsible for increased inci-
dence of skin cancer, crop reductions and even harm to the body's im-
mune system. Although the size of the hole in the ozone layer varies
seasonally and with weather patterns, recently released data has
sparked fears of wider depletion than originally postulated.' Research-
ers just back from the Arctic report surprisingly high levels of the
chemicals thought to precede ozone destruction.'
The prime suspect in the ozone layer's destruction appears to be
chlorine.' High levels of chlorine are in turn thought to be the byprod-
ucts of chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"), industrially produced synthetic
compounds of varying types and numerous applications. Commercial
issued a study supporting the team's theory. One month later, the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") announced a ban on aerosol propellant uses of
CFCs effective in 1978).
4. Fifteen years ago, scientists assumed ozone depleted only at the Poles and at a
rate of about one percent annually. But a new government panel sponsored by NASA
estimates a 1.7 percent loss in the latitudes from Florida to Pennsylvania and three
percent from Pennsylvania north to mid-Canada. These discoveries are alarming and,
as indicated by Senator Max Baucus in an address to the Senate, "[an ozone hole over
the darkened ice-sheet of Antarctica when the Sun is low presents a much different
threat than unrestrained ultraviolet radiation pounding on the surface of the ocean
when the Sun is high in the sky." 134 CONG. REC. S2110 (daily ed. March 14, 1988).
According to EPA estimates, the increased ultraviolet light from only one percent de-
pletion will result in a three to six percent increase in the rate of most skin cancers.
Gleick, supra note 2, at 30.
5. According to Adrian Tuck of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, the level of lethal chemicals was 50 times higher than normal and comparable
to that found in the Antarctic where dramatic ozone depletion occurs each spring. Arc-
tic Data Raises Fear of Wider Ozone Depletion, Boston Globe, February 18, 1989, at
1, col.l. Scientists are also alarmed by new evidence that the chemistry causing ozone
depletion can take place at higher temperatures than those found in the Arctic circles.
Id.
6. Chlorine destroys stratospheric ozone (03) by "stealing" ozone's third oxygen
atom. The result is a free oxygen atom and a highly reactive radical, chlorine monox-
ide, a compound just as destructive as the chlorine element itself. Comment, The Mon-
treal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to the Earth's Ozone Layer, 63 WASH. L. REV.
997, 1000, n.21 (1988).
Warnings regarding the extraordinarily destructive power of CFCs should be
heeded. It has been postulated that one molecule of chlorine can destroy as many as
100,000 molecules of ozone. If this estimate is accurate, the ultimate effect of an an-
nual release of approximately one million tons of CFCs would be grave. Ozone Layer
Depletion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1987)
(statement of Professor F. Sherwood Rowland, Department of Chemistry, University of
California at Irvine) [hereinafter Hearings].
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production of CFCs as refrigerants began in 1931 and, by the end of
World War II, scientists had discovered CFCs' remarkable propellant
properties as well.7 Currently, CFCs are also used as blowing agents,
producing approximately three billion pounds of plastic raw materials. 8
Both non-toxic and non-flammable, CFCs have proven ideal for indus-
trial uses because they are chemically inert. In other words, they are
immune to decomposition or oxidation in the atmosphere. It is this abil-
ity of CFCs to withstand quick destruction that makes them so envi-
ronmentally damaging. Instead of being destroyed in the lower atmo-
sphere, these chemicals rise to the stratosphere where they slowly
decompose in the sunlight, giving off deadly chlorine atoms.
In addition to their ozone depleting capabilities, CFCs also con-
tribute to global warming by absorbing energy that is normally emitted
back into the stratosphere. Accumulated in the atmosphere, these gases
create a virtual blanket around the earth's surface, resulting in an at-
mospheric temperature rise known as the "greenhouse effect." 9 Carbon
dioxide is by far the most prevalent of these "greenhouse gases." Of the
trace gases which account for approximately one-sixth of the entire gas
total, however, CFCs account for approximately one-third." Notably,
too, CFCs are increasing more rapidly than any other type."
Because of their two-fold capability for assaulting the earth's at-
mosphere, CFCs clearly pose a threat to the global environment. Frus-
trating a solution to this threat is the virtual impossibility of pinpoint-
ing and controlling all of the sources of these chemicals: CFCs are
produced and used all over the world, yet the damage is occurring
where we can be almost certain that no CFCs are being produced - in
Antarctica. Even if it were possible to somehow trace all of the sources
of these hazardous chemicals, prior international accords offer little
7. These two uses alone probably account for the dramatic changes in American
lifestyles that ushered in the post-war period. For instance, CFCs as coolants made
large air-conditioned areas such as shopping malls, high-rises and indoor stadiums a
reality. Air conditioning is arguably the factor most responsible for the development of
the Sun Belt. The chemical's importance to the U.S. is also demonstrated by the 100
million auto air conditioners currently in use. Weisskopf, CFCs: Rise and Fall of a
Chemical Miracle, Wash. Post, April 10, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
8. Id.
9. Comment, Thinning Air, Better Beware: Chlorofluorocarbons and the Ozone
Layer, 6 DiCK. J. INT'L L. 87, 92 (1987). Current measurements estimate the annual
rise in global temperatures due to increased atmospheric concentrations of gases to be
0.5 degree centigrade. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1000, n.24.
10. Hearings, supra note 6, at 253. (statement of David A. Wirth, Senior Project
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Counsel).
11. Id.
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guidance for solving environmental problems where responsibility can-
not be apportioned. A solution to the problem of ozone depletion thus
depends on unprecedented international cooperation.
III. THE ROAD To MONTREAL
The dramatic development of environmental law that occurred in
the 1970s and 1980s was largely a response to local and national pollu-
tion problems in developed countries. Despite this heightened environ-
mental conscience in some countries, the international community was
ill prepared to address the possibility of a global catastrophe produced
by destruction of the earth's ozone layer. The threat of ozone depletion
barged onto the international agenda before a legal or institutional
framework had been constructed to address such a threat. The Mon-
treal Protocol is therefore exceptional as the global community's quick
response to this challenge, especially when viewed in contrast to the
international agreements that predated it.
A. Early International Environmental Precedents
One of the earliest cases recognizing problems with the interna-
tional transport of pollutants, the 1941 Trail Smelter Case, 2 provided
the first recognition of a state's responsibility for pollutants it could not
contain within its boundaries. Still, the case sparked no international
dialogue on the matter. In oft-cited language, the international tribunal
that heard the case noted only that "no State has the right to use or
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the property or the persons
therein . . ."I3
The Corfu Channel Case eight years later was no more enlighten-
ing. "'4 The court there recognized only ". . .every State's obligation not
to allow knowingly its territory to be used contrary to the rights of
other states."' 1 While these two cases provided a starting point, the
decisions were simply too narrow to deal adequately with the problems
caused by pollution from greatly expanded worldwide economic activ-
ity. As the decades following World War II brought increased levels of
industrial development all around the world, international environmen-
tal standards noticeably lagged.
12. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
13. Id. at 1965.
14. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
15. Id. at 22.
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B. Previous Environmental Negotiations
Seemingly overnight, an international agenda on the problems of
pollutants came sharply into focus in the early 1970s. The most likely
forum for addressing these problems, the United Nations ("UN"), re-
sponded by sponsoring the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm in June of 1972. While the Stockholm Con-
ference failed to resolve the difficulties associated with unprecedented
levels of transnational pollution, the Conference did result in two sig-
nificant accomplishments. First, it produced a twenty-six principle Dec-
laration, which, while according countries the right to exploit their own
resources, explicitly acknowledged that every nation has a responsibil-
ity to ensure that such exploitation does not damage the environment
beyond its boundaries. 16 The Conference also led to the 1973 establish-
ment of the United Nations Environmental Programme ("UNEP"),
designed specifically to stimulate environmental awareness.
Although the UN has made other sporadic attempts to deal with
transnational pollution, 7 it is essentially UNEP which has forged an
international consensus on the ozone depletion issue. 8 After a success-
ful decade of sponsoring projects and cooperative ventures, UNEP or-
ganized the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the
Ozone Layer in Vienna in 1985.19 This Conference, though it did not
achieve its original goal of a draft protocol, 20 was in itself a striking
16. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Report f the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A. CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II. A.14. (1972). The Declaration how-
ever, included no substantive provisions, and thus, was of limited assistance to drafters
of a treaty intended to impose specific limits on ozone depleting chemicals.
17. Seven years later after the Stockholm Conference, the U.N. sponsored the
Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, Nov. 13, 1979, U.N. Doc. ECE/HLM.1
R.1 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442. That meeting, too, while successful at devel-
oping a process for the exchange of information on air pollutants, produced no substan-
tive guidelines on reductions. The agreement's only substantive provision, article 2, con-
tains a vague command that the participants "gradually reduce and prevent air
pollution, including long-range transboundary air pollution." 18 I.L.M. at 1443.
18. Only four years after its inception, the Programme identified ozone depletion
as one of five areas deserving of priority treatment. See generally Smith, The United
Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a Great Notion?, 19 TEX. INT'L L. J. 335,
338 (1984).
19. Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Thirteenth Session, United Na-
tions Environment Programme, 47 Doc. UNEP/GC.13/16 (1985) [hereinafter Vienna
Conference].
20. One point of contention preventing the establishment of the protocol was the
discrepancy between the U.S. proposal for a total international aerosol ban and the
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accomplishment. It produced a treaty, the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer,21 and, more importantly, it marked the
first time in history that the international community adopted anticipa-
tory safeguards to an environmental threat.
While the Convention adopted in Vienna contained no substantive
provisions, it was combined with the resolutions from the Conference to
create a framework for the Montreal Protocol. For instance, the Con-
vention included a resolution to convene a series of international work-
shops on "both short and long term strategies to control equitably
global production, emissions and uses of CFCs, taking into account the
particular situation of developing countries as well as updated scientific
and economic research."22 Participants also authorized UNEP to "con-
vene a Diplomatic Conference, if possible in 1987, for the purpose of
adopting such a protocol."23 The Convention also imposed obligations
on signatories to exchange research, cooperate in the formulation of
standards, and adopt domestic legal or administrative measures to pro-
tect human health and the environment from ozone-depleting chemi-
cals.24 These extensive provisions, while only a first step, provided the
baseline for future negotiations. Given the lack of any effective environ-
mental law precedents, the Convention must be praised for achieving a
new level of cooperation. More importantly, the drafters who met in
Montreal came equipped with knowledge of the Convention's deficien-
cies. Thus, once the groundwork was laid in Vienna, the participant
nations were qualified to conclude an accord that would address the
most obvious limitations in previous international negotiations - an
absence of both substantive controls and incentives that encouraged full
participation by the global community.
C. The Montreal Protocol
As signatories to the Vienna Convention suspected, deep cuts in
global consumption and production of CFCs were required to change
current ozone depletion rates. Accordingly, the Protocol contains rigor-
EEC recommendation for only a thirty percent reduction in aerosol use, bolstered by
limits on future CFC production capacity.
21. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. (The Vienna
Conference refers to the 1985 meeting; the Convention to the resultant treaty.)
22. Id. at 1523.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1529-1530. Article 2 of the Convention also includes a dispute resolu-
tion provision, but there is no express obligation for signatories to arbitrate before liti-
gating claims in the International Court of Justice.
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ous limitations on production, consumption and trade of chemicals as-
sociated with the main sources of ozone depletion. The Protocol also
takes an innovative approach to the issue of enforcement, adding incen-
tives for countries to join the agreement.
1. Substantive Limits
The Protocol divides the eight chemicals it regulates into two
groups, each having different schedules for reduction. Group I, consist-
ing of five fully halogenated CFCs, is scheduled for a freeze at 1986
use levels to take effect January 1, 1989.25 A thirty-percent reduction
over the next three-year period will then be followed by an additional
twenty-percent cut by January 1, 1999.26 The treaty also freezes use at
1986 levels for a second group of three halons,27 but these limits do not
begin until January of 1991.
2. Impetus for Widespread Participation
To encourage global compliance, the Protocol bans signatories
from importing CFCs or products containing them from any country
not yet a party to the agreement.2 8 Exports from signatories to non-
signatories are to be banned unless they are determined to be in com-
pliance with the reduction measures outlined in the Protocol.2 9 The ac-
cord also prohibits signatories from reaching agreements with non-sig-
natories which would provide the latter with financial assistance to
produce controlled substances.
25. The Protocol, supra note 1. The agreement gives participating countries six
months to effect the reductions, thus, the freeze will actually begin in approximately
July of 1989.
26. Id. Combined, these limits set a 1999 deadline for a fifty percent reduction in
total CFC production, but do not guarantee reductions for any one chemical. Each
chemical within a group is assigned an "ozone depletion weight", a measure of its
relative potential ability to destroy ozone molecules, and production of either CFCs or
halons, while limited to the 1986 totals, can be comprised of any combination of chemi-
cals within the group.
27. Id. Halons, most commonly found in fire extinguishants, are chemicals having
properties similar to CFCs. They are regulated separately under the agreement because
they are currently produced in far smaller quantities and less is known about world-
wide production and use of them. They are however, believed to be substantially more
potent at destroying the ozone layer than CFCs.
28. 26 I.L.M. at 1554-1555.
29. Id. The Protocol suggests signatories are to refrain from exporting to non-
signatories any technology for producing or utilizing the controlled substances and are
to avoid any new subsidies or aid for exports of controlled products or substances to
non-signatories. Id.
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The Protocol also calls for multilateral and bilateral cooperation,
specifically cooperation through international organizations on re-
search, exchange of information, and development of public awareness.
The accord establishes requirements for data reporting, calling for
UNEP to convene a meeting of government experts to recommend to
the parties measures for coordinating data on production, imports and
exports. Emphasizing technology, the Protocol calls for reductions in
emissions of controlled substances as well as the development of alter-
native chemicals and chemical products. Expanded technical assistance
is also urged, particularly in helping the developing nations to comply
and make the transition to new chemicals and technologies.3 0
Clearly, an enormous degree of cooperation was necessary to effect
these extensive provisions. But many participants have acknowledged
that agreement would never have occurred absent solid leadership from
the United States, a major producer of CFCs. As early as 1978, the
United States played a leadership role regarding CFC controls by en-
acting a near-complete domestic ban on aerosol use. Beginning in the
fall of 1986 and extending through the spring of 1987, the U.S. took
the lead, sponsoring a series of diplomatic initiatives and bilateral sci-
entific and policy missions. The strong influence of the United States is
also evident in the structure and concept of the final treaty - which is
almost identical to the one the United States began advocating in early
1986. According to Richard Benedick, the principal U.S. negotiator for
the Montreal treaty, absent the leadership of the American govern-
ment, the negotiations may have lacked the "reasoned debate" that
46 9931
"emphasize[d] science as a neutral basis for discussion ... .
Input from the American private sector and Congress also assured
the treaty's success. United States-based environmental groups, making
fastidious use of the international media, helped inform the policy mak-
ers and people of other nations of the dangers of ozone layer depletion.
The U.S. Congress also gave an all-important urgency to the treaty
negotiations by serving notice to the international community that if an
acceptable agreement was not reached, the U.S. was prepared to legis-
late unilaterally with trade restrictions against countries not accepting
responsibility for CFCs.
30. 26 I.L.M. 1557. Some of the most successful international agreements have
stressed diversity among contributors, including such varied groups as government offi-
cials, public interest groups and legal scholars. See Robinson and Waxmonsky, The
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement to Protect the Environment: 15 Years of Cooperation, 18
ENVTL L. 403, 407 (1988).
31. 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 274 (June 24, 1988).
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IV. THE PROMISE OF THE PROTOCOL:
SURMOUNTING OBSTACLES To PREVENTIATIVE REGULATION
Collectively, both the limits and the sanctions found in the treaty
effect an unusual approach to an international environmental problem.
But these features alone cannot explain the surprising success of the
negotiations. The mechanisms employed in the Protocol must also be
appreciated as the international community's first attempt to surmount
two of the most difficult barriers to effective environmental regulation
- scientific uncertainty and economic impact.
A. Scientific Uncertainty
David Doniger of the NRDC probably summed up the difficulty
with environmental regulation best when he noted the "high burden of
proof' that is needed to "convict a chemical."32 General indifference to
early warnings has been a consistent problem for environmental regula-
tors, and the experience with CFCs has been no different.33 Doniger
suggests that had the world properly dealt with early warnings and
phased out CFCs in the early 1970s, we would not now be facing de-
tectable depletion.' But the usual slowness to action has been even
more striking with regard to ozone because of the huge gaps in scien-
tific knowledge.35 Even environmentally responsible governments and
industries have been hesitant to act until the harmful impacts of cer-
tain chemicals have become clearly manifest. Yet clear evidence of
harm often does not occur until long after chemicals are released. 36
Atmospheric science, the discipline responsible for discovering the
ozone problem, is still relatively young and untested. Thus, the normal
32. Weisskopf, supra note 7.
33. Action on the early scientific findings stalled when Ronald Reagan took office
- a 1979 EPA recommendation for a freeze on U.S. production went unheeded and
DuPont halted its 15-year search for CFC substitutes - but interest reappeared in
1985 when researchers reported a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica. Based on
these recent findings, Dupont has reversed its original position and on March 24, 1988,
announced its intention to halt production of CFCs altogether. DuPont Will Stop Mak-
ing Ozone Killers, L. A. Times, March 25, 1988, at 1, col.3.
34. Id.
35. In fact, there still is no scientific consensus on the current damage to the
ozone layer. Gleick, supra note 2. As summed up in a statement of Irving Mintzer,
head of the Climate Program of the World Resources Institute, "we're asking people to
reduce the risk of an invisible, odorless, colorless gas because we perceive that there
will be a risk of destruction to an invisible shield, allowing penetration of invisible
rays." Id.
36. See supra note 2.
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difficulty preventative regulation has with scientific uncertainty is exac-
erbated when confronting ozone depletion. Even the most dire of pre-
dictions from computer models did not prepare scientists for the discov-
ery of a hole in the ozone layer.
The effort to make such models more accurate has been hampered
by the inability or failure to collect complete and consistent data." Sat-
ellite information on ozone was not recorded prior to the last decade, a
factor which has frustrated attempts to develop a reliable sense of
ozone's long-term behavior. Inadequate data is not the only distraction
for those addressing ozone depletion, however. There is still debate in
the scientific community as to the severity of the ozone problem. Some
scientists question the entire hypothesis on which ozone depletion theo-
ries rest, postulating instead that the interaction of chlorine and ozone
is closely tied to the 11-year cycle of solar radiation and that the next
few years are likely to bring a renewal of ozone as solar activity
peaks.3 8
Uncertainty as to the relative effectiveness of various control strat-
egies also remains a significant problem. Accordingly, there has been a
substantial proclivity, particularly on the part of industry, to resist reg-
ulation until the research picture is complete. Even when DuPont an-
nounced its intention to halt CFC production,39 it did not support uni-
lateral U.S. moves and refused to submit a schedule for its phaseout.
Advocating "extreme caution," the company's Freon Product Division
Environmental Manager, Dr. Joseph Steed, warned that from DuPont's
standpoint, eliminating the potential risk of depletion by taking an "un-
known or potentially greater risk . . . using replacement products that
have not been proven safe . . . is not acceptable. 40 The environmental
community on the other hand, discounts the potential threats from al-
ternatives as "minimal when compared with the threat of underesti-
mating the problem and failing to impose adequate [and timely]
controls.""'
Remarkably, the Montreal negotiations did not succumb to such
37. In fact, U.S. negotiator Benedick doubts that even the scientific knowledge of
five years ago would have been an inadequate foundation for the treaty. Stanfield,
Global Guardian, National Journal, Dec. 12, 1987.
38. See Gleick, supra note 2.
39. See supra note 33.
40. Steed, Global Cooperation, Note Unilateral Action, 5 ENVTL. F. 15, 19 (July/
August 1988). The auto industry also supports the treaty but opposes any unilateral
U.S. action. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 479 (May 29, 1987).
41. Shimberg, A Sound Framework, A Flawed Regulation, 5 ENVTL F. 15,19
(July/August 1988).
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excuses for inaction. Instead, the treaty stands on a solid scientific
foundation, relying on the most modern scientific techniques available,
including complex computer modeling, satellite measurements and ad-
vanced atmospheric chemical theories. Rather than adopt an all too
typical "wait and see" attitude, the drafters created a structure for im-
plementing future controls if the scientific evidence indicates they are
required. One article for instance, calls for parties to regularly assess
new information and to meet periodically to adjust control measures.42
Thus, the treaty not only manages current knowledge, but also demon-
strates remarkable foresight and flexibility."
B. Differential Economic Impacts
Perhaps the most difficult obstacle facing international environ-
mental regulators is the uneven distribution of costs and benefits in-
volved in imposing international controls. While all nations are certain
to be affected by the depletion of the ozone layer, not all nations will be
affected to the same degree. Considering that the annual world market
for CFCs now approaches $2.2 billion, controls are likely to inflict dis-
proportionate economic impacts upon countries heavily dependent upon
CFC use or production. To overcome this problem, some of the most
important provisions of the Protocol are intended to minimize the ad-
verse economic effects on signatory countries. Prior international efforts
were often hampered by the inability of drafters to recognize and make
concessions for these differences. Like the acid rain deliberations be-
tween the U.S. and Canada, international agreements have failed
largely because different players often have conflicting concerns. Thus,
the agreement in Montreal is most unique for its accommodation of
various parties' special economic circumstances.
For instance, at one point during the negotiations, progress stalled
42. 26 I.L.M. 1556. The first of these meetings was held in March of this year in
Great Britain. In April, Finland will host the first of the regular review meetings speci-
fied by the treaty.
43. As noted by then EPA Administrator Lee Thomas and head of the U.S. Dele-
gation to Montreal, the agreement "keeps the door open for further action if it becomes
necessary." 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at ?1347 (Sept. 18, 1987). But even before
the final ratification of the treaty, its flexibility was evident. A mere four months after
the accord was signed, thirteen chemical companies from seven nations met and agreed
to accelerate toxicity testing on CFC alternative compounds. These representatives also
agreed to a tentative schedule for additional testing and plans for the publication of
interim results. 18 Env't Rep. No. 41, at 2122 (Feb. 5, 1988). And by December of
1988, several non-governmental organizations, numerous countries, and UNEP itself
was calling for a stepped up reassessment of the limits due to mounting scientific evi-
dence. Id.
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when the Soviet Union voiced fears over what the strict controls would
do to its rather inflexible economy. Threatening to refrain from signing
the accord, the Soviets requested special permission to utilize the pro-
duction of CFC plants already under construction. To assure an orderly
phaseout, an express clause was inserted which extended the U.S.S.R.
permission to complete CFC production provided for in its most recent
five-year plan. Article 2(6) allows the Soviets to add the output of the
new plants to the 1986 base figures, for a maximum annual CFC con-
sumption of 0.5 kilograms per Soviet citizen.
Final agreement on the treaty was also threatened by the Euro-
pean Economic Community's ("EEC") last-minute demand that it be
treated as a single entity. Non-aligned participants opposed the de-
mand, primarily because a question remained as to whether the treaty
would be enforceable without ratification by all twelve individual mem-
ber countries of the Community." As now written, the compromise
provides for the treatment of the EEC as a single entity, but only after
all the member nations have individually ratified the treaty. Thus, the
agreement permits the apportionment of production and consumption
of the controlled chemicals among the Community's member nations,
provided every member nation signs the treaty and the Community
taken as a whole meets the general requirements of Article 2.'
The most significant response to differential economic impacts in-
volves the exceptions granted to "developing countries."4 Participant
developing countries now using modest amounts of the chemicals have
been allowed to increase consumption for ten years before being re-
quired to abide by the restrictions of the accord. Increases in develop-
ing countries' consumption will, however, be limited to a maximum of
0.3 kilograms per capita per year.47 To allow for export to these quali-
44. The United States also voiced opposition to common treatment, specifically
expressing fear that the new approach would set a dangerous precedent for future in-
ternational negotiations. Complete abandonment of the treaty was averted only through
frantic negotiations moderated by UNEP executive Mostafa Tolba and Ambassador
Winifred Lang, head of the Austrian delegation and chairman of the conference to
negotiate the Protocol. See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1347 (Sept. 18, 1987).
45. See 26 I.L.M. 1552. As of March of 1989, all 12 members of the EEC had
signed the treaty.
46. Although Article 5 of the treaty classifies all signatories as either developed or
developing, a definition of the term "developing" is conspicuously absent from the ac-
cord. Unfortunately, history suggests that as additional countries come under the
agreement, the omission will inevitably become the topic of future debate. See 26
I.L.M. 1555.
47. These countries currently have an average consumption of 0.2 kilogram per
capita per year. See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1347 (Sept. 18, 1987).
1990]
14 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 14
fying developing countries, producing participants will accordingly be
allowed to increase production by ten to fifteen percent.
This pragmatic attitude towards the needs of developing countries
was critical to universal acceptance of the accord. At the time of the
1972 Stockholm Conference, Third World nations regarded environ-
mental protection as a luxury of the rich, a ploy by the industrialized
nations to keep developing countries poor. But the attitude of these na-
tions is changing, due in large part to the shrewd paternalism of the
U.S. Rather than imposing its point of view upon countries with needs
divergent from its own, the U.S. is slowly convincing developing coun-
tries that economic development can and must be achieved without de-
struction of natural resource bases. By pointing to its own grave mis-
takes and by adopting stringent domestic measures, the U.S. has
strengthened and extended its commitment to reducing CFC use. For-
tunately, there is some evidence that this new approach is working: As
of March of 1989, forty-four nations representing ninety-two percent of
the world's CFC production capacity had either signed or expressed
their intention to sign the Montreal Protocol.48
V. BEYOND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
Although'the Protocol represents an impressive first step, concern
that it did not go far enough became evident almost immediately after
its signing. For instance, the Protocol does not address any chlorine
compounds other than five fully halogenated CFCs and three halons,
even though there is mounting evidence that there are more environ-
mentally damaging substances in use. Also, the signatories soon real-
ized that the provision which permits developing nations to increase use
of CFCs over the next decade could result in as much as a fifty percent
rise in worldwide consumption."9 Thus, by the time the Protocol was
ratified by the United States Senate, even its sponsors were doubting
the effectiveness of the adopted controls.5"
The true test of the treaty will be whether it can provide a suitable
foundation for strengthening controls on current producers and ex-
tending those controls to all potential producers. These criteria must be
48. Moritz, Third World and Ozone Blackmail, Christian Science Monitor,
March 23, 1989, at 18.
49. See also infra note 50.
50. Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) warned that the Protocol's reduction schedule
was "neither sufficiently rapid nor sufficiently large in magnitude," while Senator John
Chafee (R-R.I.) forthrightly stated that the version of the treaty signed in Montreal
was too weak, especially in light of developing scientific findings. Wright, States News
Service, March 14, 1988.
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fulfilled in light of accumulating scientific evidence suggesting that the
problem of ozone depletion is worse that originally suspected.
A. The Call for More Stringent Controls
Surprisingly, it has been the European Community, and not the
United States, that has stepped up the fight against ozone destruction
following the signing of the Protocol. In early March of 1989, the
twelve member nations of the European Community met in Brussels
and agreed to an immediate eighty-five percent reduction with total
elimination by the year 2000. Just days after the Brussels meeting, a
conference sponsored by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
gathered representatives of 123 nations in London to discuss, among
other things, extending the accelerated phaseout schedules to all of the
treaty's signatories. 1 While this goal was not achieved in London, the
EEC, the United States and Canada did vow to go beyond the Proto-
col's requirements and completely phaseout CFC use by the turn of the
century .52
The push for accelerated timetables however, has not met with
universal acceptance. Third World countries, embarking upon eco-
nomic developments that will necessarily involve large-scale depen-
dence on industries that use CFCs, are simply not willing to forego
growth they view as crucial.5 3 According to the developing nations, it is
the industrialized world, grown rich while creating the environmental
crisis, that is most responsible for the current damage and capable of
bearing the burdens associated with CFC elimination. 4 There is also
some suspicion on the part of developing nations that the call for steep,
immediate cuts by the West is an attempt to prevent poorer nations
51. Participants at the London meeting included China, India and the Soviet
Union, countries constituting the most vocal and influential opponents of accelerated
phaseout schedules. The EC's action apparently jolted the U.S. into action. Just days
after the unscheduled Brussels conference, William K. Reilly, President Bush's new
EPA Administrator, called for the United States to match the European plan to speed
up the timetables for phaseout.
52. President Bush, however, made it clear that the U.S. phaseout was condi-
tioned on the development of adequate substitutes. Lemonick, First Aid for the Ozone
Layer: The Movement to Ban CFC's is Starting to Roll, TIME, March 13, 1989, at 50.
53. China for instance, has recently completed 12 CFC production plants. The
need for the capacity is unquestionable. Although the country has a population of 1.1
billion, fewer than 1 in 10 families have a refrigerator. Stammer, Saving the Earth:
Who Sacrifices?, L. A. Times, March 13, 1989, at 1, col.6.
54. Stevens, Ecological Threats, Rich-Poor Tensions, N. Y. Times, March 26,
1989.
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from becoming principal players in the global economy." Lastly, Soviet
and Chinese officials have balked at the idea of accelerating the
phaseout schedules without more scientific evidence.
Because the revisions suggested in London supplant the very provi-
sions that gained the treaty widespread acceptance from Third World
nations, it will be a considerable challenge to get these nations to adopt
the changes. The thought, favored by certain politicians and govern-
ments, that a period of dirty growth is unavoidable during large scale
industrialization, must not be permitted to seduce regulators into sacri-
ficing the health of people, if not the future of the planet. Switching to
CFC substitutes is not expected to be cheap or easy. It is estimated
that worldwide restructuring of equipment to handle CFC alternatives
will cost $6 billion over the next decade. 56 According to Archie Dun-
ham, a vice president at DuPont - the largest producer of CFCs -
this figure pales in comparison to the cost of industry gearing up to
make products such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and cleaning
equipment that can operate with the new chemicals.5 1 But the current
hesitation on the part of Third World countries to agree to any con-
trols, even the lax ones contained in the Montreal Protocol, unless they
are given certain economic assurances from the West must be ad-
dressed. If populous Third World countries like China and India do not
stop CFC production, the steps taken by the West, no matter how dras-
tic, will be futile.
B. Building on the Protocol
In the face of the Third World's general reluctance to join the
Protocol, it is imperative that industrialized nations take concrete steps
to accelerate global participation. Developing countries must be ex-
tended trade, credit and/or direct financial assistance as incentives to
join in the Protocol. Most importantly, Third World nations must be
given assistance in developing and financing CFC-free industrializa-
tion.5 8 Another idea suggested in London by India and China calls for
55. Suspicions regarding motives have often been a point of contention in interna-
tional negotiations. Similar charges were levied in the late 1960s against the United
States and the Soviet Union for their attempts to curb the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. And the Brazilian government has resisted much of the environmentalism
directed towards its rainforest, claiming that it is merely a plot to keep the country
poor. Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative - Global Ecologi-
cal Disaster, 18 ENVTL. L. 537, 554-555 (1988).
56. Stammer, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. China and India for instance, made it clear at the London Conference that
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the creation of an international fund financed by developed nations to
help developing nations switch to safer chemicals.
Some of the more innovative programs utilized in other areas of
environmental law need to be expanded and adapted for use in the fight
against ozone depletion. For instance, debt swaps, used most success-
fully to prevent deforestation in South America, could be implemented
to compensate Third World countries for agreeing to halt CFC
proliferation. Principal and interest payments owed to international
lending organizations could be reduced by developed countries in return
for the forbearance of CFC use and production. Such guarantees could
be required in the future when new loans are made because interna-
tional aid agencies such as the World Bank are now much more com-
fortable with conditioning loans on the recipient country's adoption of
environmentally sound policies.59
Another promising option is one adopted just recently at a United
Nations conference focusing on international shipments of hazardous
waste. When delegates from developing countries balked, a clause was
inserted into a draft treaty which expressly recognized the wealthier
countries' responsibility for bearing a larger portion of the burdens of
control.60
C. Unilateral Moves by the United States
The United States must, as it has before, take the lead in the fight
against CFC use and production. Primary attention must be focused on
the search for CFC alternatives; our own phaseout and future Third
World development cannot be achieved without success in this area.
Since the technologies to recover and recycle CFCs are available or
discoverable, the government must develop appropriate policies to en-
courage research and implementation of these technologies, including
economic incentives for stepped-up research projects. The United
States must also make a full scale effort to educate and persuade its
citizens to prevent CFC releases. The first step in this effort could be
the offering of cash incentives to businesses and consumers for the re-
turn of discarded air conditioners and refrigerators.
The United States government must also be willing to make un-
popular political moves when necessary. Senator Chafee, for instance,
has introduced a bill that would quickly phase out CFCs domestically
they will not accept any provisions that deduct the added costs of CFC substitutes from
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and eventually ban imports that are products of or contain CFCs, un-
less the country of origin has a similar phaseout program. Though this
may not be economically advantageous to the U.S., it would be an ef-
fective weapon against potentially powerful Third World objections, es-
pecially if all developed countries were to adopt similar domestic mea-
sures. The United States should also consider using its trade leverage to
effect an immediate worldwide ban on aerosol sprays. 1
The government must also be willing to explore other alternatives
if projected reductions in CFC use fail to materialize as rapidly as ex-
pected. A proper starting point would be the promulgation of new regu-
lations to prohibit the use of CFCs in cleansing agents by the nation's
armed services. Finally, if alternatives are not developed quickly
enough by industry, the government must be willing to establish a tax
on ozone depleting chemicals. The EPA must also forge ahead with its
proposal to impose a regulatory fee on CFC producers in order to re-
move any windfall profits generated from future supply restrictions.62
VI. CONCLUSION
The difficulties of achieving international consensus on effective
regulations to protect the global atmosphere are enormous. They are
dwarfed, however, by the potentially catastrophic consequences of fail-
ing to reach such consensus. The Montreal Protocol represents a mo-
mentous advance in international environmental cooperation, but it will
not by itself solve the ozone depletion problem. The Protocol's controls
must be strengthened, and the economic concerns of developing coun-
tries must be addressed to achieve a more rapid phaseout of CFCs. It is
simply unfair to expect nations which consume a disproportionately
small share of the world's resources to bear most of the burden for a
crisis created largely by the developed world.
The limited success achieved by the Montreal Protocol to date has
raised the possibility of conquering ozone destruction. Now it has be-
come necessary for the global community to recast the treaty in a form
that will be fully effective. The ramifications of such an amended
treaty's success will be significant beyond the problem of ozone deple-
tion. For if the global community is able to overcome this one problem,
61. Despite a near total ban by the United States, many countries have not fol-
lowed suit and are still using CFCs as propellants for aerosols.
62. See S3 Fed. Reg. 30604 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (proposed
Aug. 12, 1988), for a more detailed explanation of the EPA's attempt to deal with
unintended economic consequences of regulations adopted to implement the Montreal
Protocol domestically.
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it will improve its chances of coping successfully with future environ-
mental crises that are expected to be even more politically and econom-
ically challenging.

